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Abstract  
 
The idea that parties make promises to voters during election campaigns and then 
attempt to fulfil those promises if elected to government is central to the theory and 
practice of democracy. This study examines how economic conditions affect the 
fulfilment of parties’ election pledges in Ireland. We formulate and test propositions 
relating to two mechanisms relating to economic conditions that negatively affect the 
likelihood of pledge fulfilment. The first is that parties do not adjust pledges to 
prevailing economic conditions, and the second is that they do not accurately anticipate 
future economic conditions. We test these expectations with evidence on the fulfilment 
of 3,681 pledges made by Irish parties in the period 1977 and 2011, which is one of the 
largest country-specific datasets on pledge fulfilment currently available. Given the 
considerable variation in economic conditions faced by Irish governments in this time 
period, these cases offer a particularly powerful test of the impact of economic 
conditions on pledge fulfilment. 
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According mandate theory and the responsible party model, the fulfilment of election 
pledges by governing parties is central to democratic representation, providing a 
mechanism through which citizens exercise control over public policy (Downs, 1957; 
Klingemann et al., 1994). Parties offer competing policy platforms to voters and ‘the 
party which attracts the most votes on this basis then forms the next government, but it 
is bound (both morally and by fears of retribution at the next election) to carry through 
the program on which on which it has been elected’ (Budge & Hofferbert, 1990: 111). 
Existing research on pledge fulfilment has found considerable variation in the extent to 
which governing parties fulfil their election pledges and has identified a number of 
factors that help to explain this, such as the role of the party in government, the 
institutional division of power, and the nature of the pledges made (e.g. Pomper & 
Lederman, 1980; Rallings, 1987; Royed, 1996; Thomson, 2001; Artés & Bustos, 2008; 
Naurin, 2011; 2014; Kostadinova, 2013). We contribute to this growing body of 
comparative research by examining how economic conditions influence pledge 
fulfilment.  
Our empirical analysis focuses on pledge fulfilment in Ireland over a 34-year 
period, 1977-2011. The eleven Irish governments that held office between 1977 and 
2011 varied considerably from each other with respect to the economic conditions they 
faced, including the boom years of the Celtic tiger as well as the bust following the 
2008 financial crisis. This means that our cases offer considerable variation in our key 
explanatory variables concerning economic conditions. Moreover, by examining 
variation in pledge fulfilment across these eleven governments, we hold constant 
important features of the political culture, party system and electoral system that may 
account for some of the variation in pledge fulfilment in cross-national studies. 
 Our research makes noteworthy theoretical and empirical contributions. The 
main theoretical contribution is that we formulate and test new theoretical propositions 
on the impact of economic conditions on pledge fulfilment. These propositions focus on 
the extent to which parties tailor their pledges to current and future economic 
conditions. We also control for several factors that have been examined in previous 
research, including the effect of government type on pledge fulfilment. The main 
empirical contribution is that we offer the first detailed analysis, at the level of 
individual pledges, of these cases, which together represent one of the largest country-
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specific datasets on pledge fulfilment currently available. Each of the 3,681 pledges 
made by the main parties in the elections during this period were examined qualitatively 
to assess fulfilment. The existing studies that examined subsets of the data we examine 
were limited to aggregate-level summaries of overall rates of pledge fulfilment and 
bivariate statistics, and did not examine the impact of economic conditions on pledge 
fulfilment (Mansergh, 2004; Mansergh & Thomson, 2007; Costello & Thomson, 2008). 
In contrast, the present study describes variation across each of the eleven governments 
and applies multivariate models to test our propositions on the economic factors 
affecting the likelihood of fulfilment. 
 
How economic conditions affect pledge fulfilment 
 
We argue that economic conditions are among the most important factors influencing 
the likelihood that parties deliver on their election pledges. This aligns with a great deal 
of comparative public policy research, which demonstrates that economic conditions are 
among the most important explanations of variation in policy outputs in addition to the 
partisan composition of government (e.g. Huber & Stephens, 2001). Moreover, previous 
research on election pledges suggests that economic conditions matter, although the 
propositions we formulate below have yet to be examined. In particular, previous 
research on election pledges found that parties’ pledges are concentrated on electorally 
salient policy areas such as taxation, health care, education and policing. These are 
policy areas that affect government revenue and expenditure and are consequently likely 
to be affected by the general economic situation.  
When formulating their election pledges, parties must make assumptions about 
what is possible given current and future economic growth. If these assumptions are 
accurate and pledges are tailored to prevailing and future economic conditions, then 
pledge fulfilment rates will not vary depending on economic conditions. However, there 
are two ways in which parties may fail to adjust the content of what they promise to 
economic circumstances. First, parties may make pledges that are unrealistic given what 
is known about the economy at the time they make their pledges. This means they make 
pledges that cannot be fulfilled or are very difficult to fulfil when the economy is 
relatively weak. Second, governments may encounter unexpected changes to economic 
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conditions after the election. This implies a relationship between pledge fulfilment and 
changes in economic conditions between the election year and the subsequent years of 
the governing period. These two mechanisms are now developed in more detail. 
The first mechanism posits that parties fail to adjust or at best adjust imperfectly 
the content of what they promise to match prevailing economic conditions. Such 
adjustments would imply that parties make more modest pledges that involve less 
public expenditure when the economy is performing poorly and public finances are 
under strain. This might include making fewer commitments to cut taxes cuts and 
expand programmes when the economy is weaker. Likewise, such adjustments would 
imply that more ambitious pledges, which require more public funds, are made in times 
of stronger economic growth.  
Even when the economy is expanding slowly or contracting, parties have 
incentives to promise new spending programmes and tax-cuts that are difficult to fulfil 
under these economic conditions. Indeed, we find that expansionary and tax-cutting 
pledges were made by parties in every election analysed as part of the present study, 
regardless of economic circumstances. It is commonly believed that parties put forward 
election promises they know are unrealistic. For example, a former leader of the Irish 
Labour Party, when challenged in a television interview about making an unrealistic 
pledge on child benefit that could not be kept given the economic circumstances, said 
‘isn’t that what you tend to do in an election?’ (Brown 2012)1. Such ‘over pledging’ is 
rational if parties place greater value on short-term electoral gains than on any potential 
long-term reputational damage that might be caused by breaking election promises. In 
their model of electoral competition, Callander and Wilkie (2007) find that candidates 
who lie about their policy intentions during an election campaign are at a competitive 
advantage. Moreover, it could be argued that pledges to cut taxes and expand 
programmes are exactly the sort of expansionary policies that are needed to boost the 
economy when it is weak according to Keynesian economic theory. Regardless of the 
economic merits of such pledges, we argue that they are more difficult to fulfil when the 
economy is weaker and public finances are under pressure. This is particularly true 
when international financial institutions impose constraints on governments during 
                                                 
1
 The politician in question later said that what he meant was that parties do not explain 
to voters that their promises are dependent on economic circumstances (Reilly 2013).  
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economic crises. Not all pledges involve more government expenditure, but those that 
do are more likely to be fulfilled if the prevailing economic conditions are favourable. 
These considerations lead to the following hypotheses: 
H1a: Pledges are more (less) likely to be fulfilled if they are made in election years of 
stronger (weaker) economic growth.  
H1b: This effect of growth in election years is strongest for pledges to cut taxes and 
expand programmes. 
The second mechanism refers to the difference between economic conditions in 
the election year and in subsequent governing years. Changes in economic conditions 
are notoriously difficult to predict (Kenny & Williams, 2001). In the Spring of 2007, the 
European Commission expected the Irish economy to grow by 4% in 2008 (European 
Commission, 2007), while the economy contracted by -3% in 2008 and -7% in 2009. 
Such large differences between forecasted and actual growth rates are unusual, but 
illustrate the uncertainty surrounding the differences between current and future levels 
of growth. These changes affect the likelihood of pledge fulfilment positively if they 
provide windfalls to public finances, and negatively if they reduce the amount of public 
finances available. Such changes in economic conditions are particularly relevant to 
pledges that put pressure on public finances, namely pledges to cut taxes or expand 
programmes. These arguments lead to the following expectations: 
H2a: Pledges are more (less) likely to be fulfilled, the greater the increase (decrease) in 
economic growth between the year of the election campaign and the average growth in 
the subsequent years of the governing period. 
H2b: This effect of changes in economic growth is strongest for pledges to cut taxes and 
expand programmes. 
We do not formulate a separate hypothesis on the effects of the average level of growth 
during the governing years, since this is a linear function of growth in the election year 
and the change in growth referred to above. Empirically, our measure of change in 
growth is also very highly correlated (r=.80) with the average level of growth in the 
governing years. 
 While we are primarily interested in the effects of economic conditions, it is 
important to consider other factors that may influence pledge fulfilment. The most 
obvious factor to consider is whether or not a given party enters government after the 
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election. We therefore investigate the extent to which pledges made by parties that enter 
government, which we will refer to as ‘governing parties’, are more likely to be fulfilled 
than pledges made by parties that do not, which we will refer to as ‘opposition parties’. 
While our main interest lies in governing parties’ pledges, we conduct a separate 
analysis of the impact of economic conditions on opposition parties’ pledges. Pledges to 
cut taxes and expand programmes are likely to be popular, and governing parties are 
likely to adopt these if economic conditions permit, even if they did not make the 
pledges themselves.  
Within the set of governing parties, we expect to find the highest rates of pledge 
fulfilment in single-party governments with secure majorities. Coalition government 
compels governing parties to moderate their policy demands, either by dropping their 
demands on particular policy issues or by agreeing to compromise outcomes that differ 
from their election pledges. Governing parties that do not control secure parliamentary 
majorities may face pressures similar to parties in coalition governments. Policy 
concessions to one or more opposition parties may be required in exchange for their 
support to get bills passed.  
We also control for the fact that some pledges are made by more than one party. 
For example, Fianna Fáil and the Progressive Democrats formed a coalition in 2002 on 
the basis of election manifestos in which approximately 30 per cent of pledges made by 
each party were in agreement, while only 2 per cent were in direct disagreement. We 
expect that pledges made by parties in coalition governments are more likely to be 
fulfilled when there is consensus among coalition members. We also expect explicit 
consensus between governing and opposition parties to increase the likelihood of pledge 
fulfilment, because such agreement among parties indicates that the policies are widely 
supported and are therefore more likely to be implemented. 
 The analyses also control for which party held the chief executive post. The 
Taoiseach was always held by the largest party in the governments we examine. Models 
of coalition formation highlight the power of the largest party, which is usually the party 
that initiates the process of coalition formation (Baron, 1991; Diermeier & Feddersen, 
1998; Austen-Smith & Banks, 1988; see Laver et al., 2011 for a critique of this 
approach). Some policy concessions must be offered to the junior coalition partner or 
partners, to make the offer more attractive than the reversion point (i.e. the position of a 
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caretaker government), but the largest party holds an advantage. In the Irish context, 
while there is no formal formatuer party, the initiative in government formation usually 
goes to the largest party. Other models of coalition politics also attribute considerable 
power to the largest party after the coalition has taken office. For Huber (1996), the vote 
of confidence procedure is an important institution. This procedure enables the prime 
minister to raise the stakes in any vote in parliament by making it a vote of confidence 
in the government. This severely limits the extent to which junior coalition parties can 
shape policy outcomes. Qualitative studies also show how the prime ministership plays 
a vital role in coordinating the overall direction of policy and setting priorities in 
modern cabinet governance, and Ireland is often considered to be a country where 
power is centralized in the chief executive or Taoiseach (King, 1994; O’Leary, 1991).  
 An alternative view of coalition policymaking is that each party pursues its own 
agenda in the ministries it controls, and consequently we control for the distribution of 
ministerial portfolios. Laver and Shepsle (1996) argue that policymaking in modern 
states is structured by the division of policy areas into ministerial jurisdictions, whereby 
parties have little say in policy areas over which they do not receive ministerial control. 
According to this model, parties will be persuaded to participate in a coalition only if 
they believe it to be credible in terms of policy. The distribution of ministerial portfolios 
provides such credibility.
2
 In addition, models of ministerial drift posit that ministers 
may be tempted to push initiatives that differ from their government’s common 
platform (Huber & Shipan, 2002: 185; Martin & Vanberg, 2004: 15-6). Norms of 
ministerial responsibility and non-interference in other ministers’ portfolios, as well as 
information asymmetries, discourage other cabinet ministers from detecting this 
ministerial drift.  
 The analyses also control for the duration of each of the governments. Like 
public finances, time is a resource that governments need to enact policy change. We 
expect that parties in short-lived governments are less likely to fulfil their pledges. 
Finally we control for the numbers of pledges made by each party, since it might be that 
a larger number of pledges are harder to fulfil. 
                                                 
2
 Laver and Shepsle’s model also refers specifically to the government agreement between the 
coalition partners. We do not include a separate variable in the analyses for the coalition 
agreement since there is reason to believe this is endogenous to some of the other explanatory 
variables, notably the allocation of ministerial portfolios and agreement among parties.  
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Case selection 
 
The dataset we examine includes pledges made by eight parties in the ten elections held 
between 1977 and 2007. These eight parties include all major parties according to a 
broad definition that includes all nationally organized parties that won at least two 
parliamentary seats. Six of these eight parties participated in government at some time 
during the 1977-2011 time period examined here. Either Fianna Fáil or Fine Gael has 
been in government throughout this period, but never together. Four other parties have 
participated in government at various times. The Labour Party was a junior coalition 
partner in a Fine Gael-led government on three occasions during this period (1981-82; 
1982-87; 1994-97), and entered a coalition with Fianna Fáil on one occasion (1992-94). 
The Progressive Democrats (PDs) held office as a junior coalition partner with Fianna 
Fáil in four governing periods considered here: 1989-92, 1997-2002, and 2002-07, and 
also joined the government that formed in 2007. After a decline in electoral support, the 
PDs began the process of disbanding in 2008, while its leader remained in government 
as an independent. The Democratic Left, which formed in 1992, held office together 
with Fine Gael and Labour, 1994-97, before merging with the Labour Party in 1999. 
The Green Party’s 1997, 2002 and 2007 manifestos are included in the present study. In 
2007 the Greens participated in government for the first time. Parties that were in 
opposition during the time period considered here are the Workers Party and Sinn Féin. 
The Workers Party was the predecessor to the Democratic Left. Sinn Féin’s 2002 and 
2007 manifestos are included in the present study. We do not examine the fulfilment of 
independents’ election pledges, because they do not issue election manifestos that are 
comparable to those of national parties. Instead, independents generally focus more on 
local issues.  
 The time period from 1977 onwards is a reasonable starting point for the 
analysis of election pledges because the 1977 Irish parliamentary election was a 
watershed in the development of comprehensive party platforms. Although both Labour 
and Fine Gael had been publishing manifestos for decades, 1977 was the first time that 
Fianna Fáil issued one. Fianna Fáil’s conduct in the 1977 election campaign displayed a 
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higher level of professionalism than in previous elections (Farrell & Manning, 1978: 
154). 
 Table 1 summarizes the composition and duration of the governments examined 
in the present study. The three single-party governments included in our study are all 
Fianna Fáil governments. Two of the four minority governments - Fianna Fáil 1982 and 
Fianna Fáil/PDs in 1997 – concluded agreements with independent parliamentarians, 
while the other two did not. The coalition of Fine Gael/Labour/Democratic Left that 
governed 1994-97 is unusual in that it formed two years after the previous election in 
1992. The election pledges for this governing period were those made in 1992 that were 
not fulfilled in the previous 1992-94 governing period. Given the uniqueness of this 
government we include an additional control variable for it in our analyses.  
 
Table 1. The eleven Irish governments included in the study 
Parliamentary 
support 
Single-party Coalition 
Minority 82: Fianna Fáil (9 months) 
87-89: Fianna Fáil 
81-82: Fine Gael/Labour (8 months) 
97-02: Fianna Fáil/ Progressive Democrats 
Majority 77-81: Fianna Fáil 82-87: Fine Gael/Labour 
89-92: Fianna Fáil/ Progressive Democrats 
92-94: Fianna Fáil/ Labour 
94-97: Fine Gael/Labour/Democratic Left 
02-07: Fianna Fáil/ Progressive Democrats 
07-11: Fianna Fáil/ Greens/ Progressive Democrats† 
† Note The 20017-11 coalition lost its majority when the Progressive Democrats disbanded in 2009, but 
the PD leader, Mary Harney, retained her cabinet post and supported the government as an independent. 
 
 Irish governments faced radically different economic conditions during the 
period examined here, which allow us to test our main theoretical propositions. 
Governments in the early 1980s managed an economy with sluggish growth and 
strained public sector finances. By contrast, governments in the late 1990s and early 
2000s had managed a booming economy. Average economic growth reached its peak in 
the 1997-02 governing period at an average of 9.2 per cent each year. The 2007-11 
period contains one of the most dramatic economic crises experienced by a Western 
government in recent decades. It revealed that Ireland’s previous growth had coincided 
with an unsustainable property bubble and imprudent lending practices. The 
government initiated a massive bailout of Irish banks in 2008, amidst rising 
unemployment and soaring costs of government borrowing in international bond 
markets. This led to an international troika of the European Commission, the European 
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Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund granting a bailout to the Irish 
exchequer in 2010 (Murphy, 2011). Many observers concluded that the Irish 
government was effectively no longer in charge of running the country. The sitting 
coalition of Fianna Fáil and the Green Party fell, and both governing parties were 
punished severely by voters in February 2011, after which a new coalition consisting of 
Fine Gael and the Labour Party took office. 
 
Identifying election pledges and measuring fulfilment and other variables 
 
Most of the election pledges examined here are sourced from parties’ manifestos. 
Although few voters actually read manifestos in detail, these documents contain the 
most definitive statements of the policies forwarded by parties during the campaign. 
There are two exceptions to this focus on manifestos where one of the parties did not 
publish a manifesto. The first exception is Fine Gael; it did not publish a manifesto in 
the February 1982 election. Instead, it fought the campaign on the basis of its recently 
defeated budget. Fine Gael’s policy intentions were set out in a speech given in defence 
of that budget by the then Taoiseach, Garret FitzGerald, to Galway Chamber of 
Commerce. This speech is used in place of a party manifesto. The second exception is 
that Fianna Fáil did not produce a manifesto for the November 1982 election. Here, the 
party leader wrote an article in the Irish Times just before the election, which other 
researchers have used as a substitute for the manifesto (for example in the Comparative 
Manifestos Project). However, this speech did not contain any testable pledges and so 
we exclude it from the analysis. 
 We consider a statement to be a pledge if it contains ‘unequivocal support for a 
specific action or outcome that is testable’. This definition follows the definition 
proposed by Royed (1996). In line with Thomson (2001), we add that for a statement to 
be a pledge, it must identify the ‘criteria on the basis of which we can examine whether 
the pledge is fulfilled’. Regarding the strength of ‘unequivocal commitment’ required, 
we include ‘soft’ commitments, such as ‘we support’ or ‘we will strive toward’, as well 
as ‘hard’ commitments, such as ‘we will’ or ‘we promise to’. With respect to the 
amount of detail required on the action or outcome, our definition of an election pledge 
requires that parties specify the criteria on the basis of which we can assess fulfilment. 
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It is not enough for a party to refer to a policy problem and say it will do something 
about this problem. So the statement that ‘we will actively support the development of 
industry-based research capacity’ (found in the Fianna Fáil manifesto of 2002) does not 
meet our definition. We argue that there are many different ways of increasing industry-
based research capacity, including tax breaks for research and development in the 
private sector, subsidies for collaboration between universities and industry, as well as 
direct public funding of innovation in companies. Our choice of specific and directly 
testable statements is appropriate in the Irish context because parties are quite detailed 
when setting out their policy intentions. Thomson et al. (2014) provide a more detailed 
discussion of this definition of election pledges and the following reliability tests.  
 Each manifesto was coded by a researcher who is familiar with the Irish political 
context. The researcher went through the manifesto line by line, marking the statements 
that met the definition of an election pledge. Similar pledges, or pledges that elaborated 
on a previous pledge (e.g. a pledge to reduce the basic rate of taxation followed by a 
pledge to reduce the basic rate of taxation to a specific percentage) were combined and 
counted as single pledges. As part of a series of reliability tests, seven researchers 
independently coded portions of a manifesto using this definition of election pledges. 
Each coder identified approximately 65 election pledges. The average paired reliability 
for the exercise was 76 per cent, with a range of 64 to 86 per cent.
3
 
Irish parties make considerable numbers of election pledges. On average, each 
manifesto or equivalent includes 72.9 pledges (n=45).
4
 Fianna Fáil, however, made only 
two pledges in February 1982 manifesto, and none in the newspaper article that other 
researchers have used as a substitute for its November 1982 manifesto. By contrast, 
Fianna Fáil’s 1997 manifesto contained the largest numbers of pledges. Given this 
variation, we include the (logged) number of pledges as a control variable in our 
analyses. The most common type of pledge consists of pledges to expand particular 
programmes or make changes that would imply increases in government spending. For 
example, Fianna Fáil promised to end hospital waiting lists, reduce class sizes in 
                                                 
3
 The analysis integrates data from two previous studies (Mansergh, 2004; Costello & Thomson, 
2008), as well as new data from the 2007-11 period. The data from the 2002 manifestos include 
socioeconomic pledges only, which make up approximately half of all pledges made. There is 
no significant difference between the rates of fulfilment of socioeconomic pledges and other 
pledges. 
4
 Excludes pledges from 2002. 
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schools, and increase the numbers of policy officers. All such pledges are categorized as 
‘expansionary pledges’. The distinction between pledges to expand programmes, cut 
taxes and other types of pledges (including those to maintain the status quo, change 
regulations and less commonly to raise taxes and cut programmes) has been applied in 
other studies of election pledges (see Thomson et al. 2014). Håkansson and Naurin 
(2014: 10) reported a very high level of reliability of this categorization scheme based 
on over 200 Swedish pledges. 
The sources consulted to assess the fulfilment of each pledge depend on the 
content of the pledge. The relevant criteria for assessing pledge fulfilment are identified 
in the pledges themselves, since we define a pledge as unequivocal support for a 
particular action or outcome that is specified in enough detail to enable researchers to 
test whether or not the action or outcome was realized. The pledges led the researchers 
to examine a range of relevant legislation, ministerial decisions, spending allocations, 
parliamentary records and official reports. The Legislation Directory of the Irish Statute 
Book was a useful source for searching for changes to Irish law in line with election 
pledges.  
Each pledge was categorised as fully fulfilled, partially fulfilled or not fulfilled. 
For example, we judged as fully fulfilled Fianna Fáil’s 2002 pledge to establish a 
training fund of up to €2,500 per person for unemployed people facing serious barriers 
to employment. The High Support Process was introduced by the National Training and 
Employment Authority (FÁS), in 2003. This measure is designed to assist FÁS 
Employment Officers to better meet the needs of clients who, because of health, literacy 
or other difficulties experience major barriers to finding employment. In 2006, a total of 
€2,500 per person was available under this scheme to resource the relevant interventions 
such as counselling and supplemental training.
5
 The Progressive Democrats’ 2002 
pledge to reduce the top rate of income tax from 42 to 40 per cent was only partly 
fulfilled because the top rate had been reduced to 41 per cent by 2007. Our tests reveal a 
high level of inter-coder reliability for this method. A total of 40 pledges were randomly 
selected and examined by seven researchers. For each pledge, one of the researchers 
provided the other researchers with the evidence he or she used to evaluate the 
fulfilment of each pledge without revealing his or her evaluation. Each of the seven 
                                                 
5
 FÁS Annual Report 2003; Dáil Debates 623: 1596, 6 July 2006. 
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researchers then independently categorizes each pledge as ‘fully’, ‘partly’, or ‘not’ 
fulfilled. On all 40 cases, the majority of the seven researchers agreed on the same 
coding. On 27 of the 40 pledges, all seven researchers agreed on the same 
categorization; on eight of the 40 pledges, six researchers agreed; on five pledges, four 
researchers agreed; and on one pledge four researchers agreed. Across the 40 pledges, 
we found an average agreement rate of 93 per cent. 
Data on growth rates of GDP were sourced from the World Bank. 
 
Analysis 
 
 
Figure 1 summarizes pledge fulfilment during each of the eleven governments. Pledges 
made by parties that entered government have a higher rate of fulfilment than pledges 
made by parties that entered the opposition. Of the 1,784 pledges by governing parties 
802 (45 per cent) were at least partially fulfilled and 575 (32 per cent) fully fulfilled. Of 
the 1,897 pledges made by opposition parties, 728 (38 per cent) were at least partially 
fulfilled and 463 (24 per cent) fully fulfilled. The difference between governing and 
opposition parties’ pledge fulfilment, although not large, is statistically significant (Chi-
2 16.38, p=.00).  
The case of Fianna Fáil in the February 1982 election is unusual in that the party 
only made two pledges according to the definition of pledge used here, and these were 
not contained in a manifesto. These two pledges do not appear to be particularly 
important. One was to reinstate parents’ right to allow their children access to school 
from the age of four, while the other was to abolish VAT on footwear and children’s 
clothing (both were fulfilled). The pledges made by Fine Gael in the February 1982 
election were also not contained in a manifesto. The findings presented below are 
substantively the same if these pledges are excluded from the analysis. Moreover, the 
number of pledges made in a manifesto, which is included as a control variable in our 
models, does not affect the likelihood of pledge fulfilment. 
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Figure 1. Pledge fulfilment in Ireland, 1977-2011.  
Note: Black bars refer to the percentages of fully-fulfilled pledges; grey bars to partially-fulfilled pledges. 
G. stands for ‘governing parties’; O. for ‘opposition parties’. 1982F refers to the February 1982 election 
and 1982N to the November 1982 election. The numbers refer to the total number of tested pledges made 
by governing and opposition parties.  
 
We apply logistic regression models to examine the factors that affect the 
likelihood of pledge fulfilment. The dependent variable in each of these analyses is a 
dichotomous measure indicating whether the pledge is at least partly fulfilled (1) or not 
fulfilled (0).
6
 Table 2 contains models that focus on governing parties’ pledges. The 
only difference between Models 1 and 2 is that the first model does not include the 
interaction terms between economic conditions and pledge type while the second model 
does. Table 3 presents the same models for opposition parties’ pledges. For each set of 
analysis we first discuss our main findings with respect to theoretical propositions on 
the impact of economic conditions and then summarize the main findings from the 
control variables. 
 
                                                 
6
 We also applied multinomial models with a three-category dependent variable. The results 
were substantively the same, but we prefer the logistic regression since the results are more 
readily interpretable. 
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Table 2. The impact of economic conditions on the fulfilment of governing parties’ 
pledges 
 Model 1 
(Without interactions) 
Model 2 
(With interactions) 
 b (s.e.) p b (s.e.) p 
Economic conditions     
Growth in election year .10 (.04) .01 .10 (.04) .01 
Change in growth .12 (.04) .00 .10 (.04) .01 
Economic conditions and 
type of pledge 
    
Expansionary pledge .46 (.10) .00 .79 (.19) .00 
Tax cut pledge .32 (.25) .20 .21 (.40) .61 
Growth in election year × 
expansionary  pledge                      
  -.03 (.02) .07 
Growth in election year × 
tax cut pledge 
  .07 (.05) .12 
Change in growth × 
expansionary  pledge                      
  .05 (.02) .03 
Change in growth × tax cut 
pledge 
  .17 (.05) .00 
     
Control variables     
Government type  
(reference group: coalition 
parties, no agreement) 
    
Coalition (with consensus) .70 (.16) .00 .68 (.17) .00 
Single-party gov’t -.07 (.18) .70 -.01 (.18) .94 
Majority government .05 (.22) .83 .03 (.21) .88 
Position of party in coalition      
Prime ministership .51 (.13) .00 .47 (.14) .00 
Relevant ministry .14 (.17) .41 .16 (.17) .34 
Duration  
(reference group: 3+ years) 
    
Less than 1 year -1.77 (.39) .00 -1.85 (.38) .00 
1 to 3 years -.26 (.24) .28 -.31 (.24) .20 
Opposition support .70 (.16) .00 .57 (.18) .00 
Number of pledges (ln) -.07 (.17) .67 -.05 (.18) .80 
1994 government 
 
-.86 (.29) .00 -.90 (.31) .00 
Constant -.52 (.81) .52 -.69 (.82) .40 
Chi2 (p) 557.02 (.00) 6854.22 (.00) 
Log pseudolikelihood -1070.94 -1065.37 
n pledges (manifestos) 1,784 (21) 1,784 (21) 
Note: Logistic regression analysis; dependent variable is a dichotomous indicator of whether a pledge is 
fulfilled/partially fulfilled (1) or not fulfilled (0). Standard errors clustered by manifesto. 
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 The models in Table 2 provide evidence that economic conditions affect the 
likelihood of pledge fulfilment, particularly for pledges to expand programmes and to 
cut taxes. We included two economic variables in the models: 1) GDP growth in the 
year of the election in which the parties made the pledges; and 2) change in growth, 
which is measured by the average growth in GDP during the governing years after the 
election year minus growth in the election year. This second measure has a positive 
value when economic conditions improved and a negative value when economic 
conditions deteriorated. These two variables ‘Growth in election year’ and ‘Change in 
growth’ are not highly correlated in our sample (r=-.19 in the sample of 1,784 
observations examined in Table 2).  
The evidence indicates that both of our economic variables have significant 
effects on the likelihood of pledge fulfilment. Model 1 includes only the direct effects of 
these variables. Both ‘Growth’ and ‘Change in growth’ have positive and significant 
effects on the likelihood that pledges made by governing parties are fulfilled.  
 Model 2 includes the interaction terms between the economic variables (both 
‘Growth in election year’ and ‘Change in growth’) and ‘Expansionary’ and ‘Tax cut’ 
pledges since these are the types of pledges we expect to be particularly affected by 
changes in economic conditions. The evidence does not support the expectation that the 
impact of growth in the election year is particularly strong for these types of pledges. 
Neither of the two interaction terms between growth in election year and pledge type is 
significant (p<.05) and one is negative, which is in the opposite direction to the 
expectation. 
 However, the evidence does clearly support our expectation that the impact of 
changes in growth is stronger for pledges to cut taxes and expand programmes. Both of 
the interactions between change in growth and pledge type is positive and statistically 
significant (p<.05). The impact of change in growth on the likelihood that pledges to cut 
taxes are fulfilled appears to be particularly large. The effects of changes in economic 
growth are illustrated graphically in Figure 2. Rates of economic growth varied 
considerably in Ireland between 1977 and 2011, from a high of 11.50 in 1997 to a low 
of -6.99 in 2009. There is also considerable variation in the difference between 
economic growth in each election year compared to the subsequent governing years. 
The variable ‘Change in growth’ ranges from a high of 5.55 to a low of -8.65 (average -
 17 
1.11; standard deviation 3.43). Figure 2 depicts estimates of the probability that pledges 
are at least partially fulfilled for a range of plausible values of ‘Change in growth’: -5 
per cent to + 5 per cent. The ascending lines indicate that the probability of fulfilment 
increases for all types of pledges as economic conditions improve relative to the year in 
which the pledges were made. As expected, the probability that pledges to cut certain 
taxes are fulfilled is particularly sensitive to changes in economic conditions. 
 
 
Figure 2. The effect of changes in economic conditions on the fulfilment of governing parties’ 
pledges 
Estimated with Model 2 in Table 2, holding the values of other explanatory variables at their means (for 
scale variables) or modes (for categorical variables). Positive (negative) values of “Change in GDP 
growth” indicate a improvement (deterioration) in economic conditions since the election year. 
 
The first of the control variables in Table 2 refers to the effect of power sharing 
and agreement between coalition parties. The variables ‘Coalition (with consensus)’ and 
‘Single-party government’ are part of a three-category independent variable. The 
reference group in this three-category variable consists of governing coalition parties’ 
pledges that are not in direct agreement with pledges of their coalition partners. The 
coefficient for the variable ‘Coalition (with consensus)’ is positive and significant. This 
indicates that pledges made by parties that enter coalition governments in which their 
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coalition parties make similar pledges are significantly more likely to be fulfilled than 
pledges made by parties that enter coalitions in which their partners did not make 
similar pledges. The coefficient for the variable ‘Single-party government’, however, is 
insignificant, which indicates that pledges made by parties that enter single-party 
governments are no more likely to be fulfilled than are pledges made by parties that 
enter coalitions without consensus on the issues on which they made their pledges. 
The finding that single-party governments are not associated with overall higher 
rates of pledge fulfilment than coalition governments in Ireland is surprising and 
deserves closer scrutiny. The non-finding with respect to single-party government is to 
some extent affected by the fact that our models include a dummy-variable to control 
for the 1994-97 coalition government of Fine Gael, Labour and Democratic Left, which 
formed two years after the 1992 election, as well as controls for the allocation of 
ministerial portfolios and the chief executive. The 1994-97 coalition had a particularly 
low level of pledge fulfilment, which is evident in Figure 1 and in the fact that the 
relevant coefficients in Table 2 are negative and highly significant. Moreover, 
governing parties in single-party governments by definition hold the relevant portfolio 
and chief executive post. When we exclude these control variables from Model 2, the 
coefficient for the variable ‘Single-party government’ remains positive and becomes 
marginally significant (p=.08). Nonetheless, we present the model with these controls 
since our primary theoretical interest lies in the effects of economic conditions and we 
wish to estimate these effects while controlling for other relevant factors. 
The next variable, ‘Majority government’, indicates whether parties are more 
likely to fulfil their pledges if they enter majority governments rather than minority 
governments. The coefficient for this variable is not statistically significant. So there is 
no evidence that majority governments are on the whole better able to fulfil their 
election pledges than parties in minority governments. We noted above that minority 
governments differ with respect to whether they had made deals with independent 
parliamentarians, but this does not affect our results. We created a dummy variable for 
the two governments that did not conclude agreements with independents (the Fine 
Gael/Labour coalition formed in 1981 and the single-party Fianna Fáil government 
formed in 1987). When added to Model 2, this dummy variable has a negative sign as 
expected, but is insignificant, while the coefficient for majority status remains 
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insignificant. Therefore, the evidence does not suggest that parties in majority 
governments are more likely to fulfil their election pledges than parties in minority 
governments. 
As anticipated, pledges made by parties that hold the prime ministership are 
significantly more likely to be fulfilled than those made by a junior coalition partner. 
However, the results do not support the expectation that pledges are more likely to be 
fulfilled when the party held the relevant ministry. These findings hold even if we 
restrict the analysis to governing parties that entered coalitions.  
Of the remaining control variables, government duration and opposition support 
are associated with significant effects. Parties in governments of very short durations of 
less than one year are less likely to fulfil their pledges than parties in governments that 
last longer than three years. Opposition support increases the likelihood of pledge 
fulfilment. When a governing party’s pledge is similar to a pledge made by an 
opposition party, the likelihood of fulfilment increases significantly.  
 Our multivariate analyses did not include variables that identified pledges to 
maintain the status quo or pledges to bring about a certain outcome as opposed to taking 
a certain action that is in principle within the control of government. The reason for 
omitting these variables is that we have relatively few observations of them. Status quo 
and outcome pledges each account for less than 2 per cent of our observations. 
Although the numbers of cases prevent us from examining the effects in our 
multivariate analyses, we would expect that status quo pledges are more likely to be 
fulfilled. Indeed, of the 29 status quo pledges made by governing parties, 25 (86 per 
cent) were at least partially fulfilled, compared to 44 per cent of other types of pledges 
made by parties that went on to govern. We might also have expected that outcome 
pledges would be harder to fulfil. However, of the 21 outcome pledges, 16 were at least 
partially fulfilled. Given the small numbers of observations, we attach little importance 
to this particular finding. The results are the same if we exclude these pledges from the 
analysis. 
 We now turn to the fulfilment of opposition parties’ pledges in Table 3. 
Economic conditions have strong effects on the likelihood that opposition parties’ 
pledges are fulfilled. As was the case for governing parties’ pledges, opposition parties’ 
pledges are significantly more likely to be fulfilled in periods of stronger growth, when 
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growth in the year in which the pledges were made is higher. We also find significant 
interactions between both economic variables and pledge type. Expansionary pledges 
made by opposition parties are significantly more likely to be fulfilled as the economic 
situation in the election year improves. Furthermore, as the economic situation improves 
between the election year and the governing years, opposition parties’ expansionary 
pledges are more likely to be fulfilled. The coefficients associated with the interactions 
between the economic variables and tax cut pledges are not significant, although are in 
the expected direction and not far from conventional levels of significance. 
Of the control variables, support for opposition parties’ pledges by other parties, 
particularly by governing parties, has a strong positive effect on the fulfilment of 
opposition parties’ pledges. This indicates that many of the opposition parties’ pledges 
that were fulfilled are similar to governing parties’ pledges. The positive and significant 
coefficient for the 1994-97 coalition indicates that opposition parties’ pledges were 
more likely to be fulfilled during this governing period. This reflects the fact that 
relatively many of the opposition Fianna Fáil and Progressive Democrats pledges were 
at least partially fulfilled (28 out of 45 or 62 percent). 
There is no evidence that the fulfilment of opposition parties’ pledges is more 
likely if there is a minority government, because the coefficient for ‘Majority 
government’ is insignificant. We also ran the same model with an additional control for 
the two minority governments that did not conclude agreements with independents (the 
Fine Gael/Labour coalition formed in 1981 and the single-party Fianna Fáil government 
formed in 1987). This variable was insignificant.  
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Table 3. The impact of economic conditions on the fulfilment of opposition parties’ 
pledges 
 Model 1 
(Without interactions) 
Model 2 
(With interactions) 
 b (s.e.) p b (s.e.) p 
Economic conditions     
Growth in election year .16 (.06) .00 .12 (.06) .04 
Change in growth .10 (.03) .00 .08 (.03) .01 
Economic conditions and 
type of pledge 
    
Expansionary pledge .46 (.13) .00 -.14 (.28) .61 
Tax cut pledge .26 (.32) .42 -.27 (.63) .67 
Growth in election year × 
expansionary  pledge                      
  .13 (.04) .00 
Growth in election year × 
tax cut pledge 
  .12 (.07) .08 
Change in growth × 
expansionary  pledge                      
  .06 (.03) .01 
Change in growth × tax cut 
pledge 
  .13 (.09) .17 
     
Control variables     
Majority government -.22 (.32) .49 -.21 (.32) .52 
Government support .83 (.14) .00 .84 (.15) .00 
Opposition support .31 (.16) .04 .30 (.16) .05 
Duration  
(reference group: 3+ years) 
    
Less than 1 year .49 (.57) .39 .66 (.60) .27 
1 to 3 years .19 (.33) .57 .25 (.34) .46 
Number of pledges (ln) .18 (.16) .27 .22 (.16) .18 
1994 government 
 
.72 (.28) .01 .64 (.26) .02 
Constant -2.34 (.81) .00 -2.34 (.81) .00 
Chi2 (p) 276.41 (.00) 440.54 (.00) 
Log pseudolikelihood -1142.45 -1134.90 
n pledges (manifestos) 1,897 (29) 1,897 (29) 
Note: Logistic regression analysis; dependent variable is a dichotomous indicator of whether a pledge is 
fulfilled/partially fulfilled (1) or not fulfilled (0). Standard errors clustered by manifesto 
  
 
Conclusions 
 
Across a range of government types and economic conditions, the evidence shows that 
pledges are generally more likely to be fulfilled if the parties that made them entered 
government office than the opposition after the elections. This accords with mandate 
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theory and the responsible party model (Downs, 1957; Klingemann et al., 1994). 
Although significant, the difference between governing and opposition parties’ rates of 
pledge fulfilment was not always large, and from a comparative perspective, rates of 
pledge fulfilment for governing parties in Ireland tend to be lower than in other western 
democracies. Our investigation focused mainly on the impact of economic conditions 
on the likelihood of pledge fulfilment, while controlling for other relevant factors 
 We found evidence for two mechanisms through which economic conditions 
affect pledge fulfilment. First, parties tend not to adjust their pledges fully to the 
prevailing economic conditions, which means that their pledges require more resources 
than prevailing economic conditions allow when the economy is weak. Consequently, 
when economic conditions in the year in which parties formulate their pledges are more 
favourable, pledges are more likely to be fulfilled. This supports the commonly held 
belief that parties do not always make pledges that can be delivered realistically given 
the available resources. Second, parties are to a considerable extent at the mercy of 
unpredictable economic developments (Kenny & Williams, 2001). Therefore, when 
economic conditions deteriorate after the election, election pledges are less likely to be 
fulfilled. As expected, the effects of changes in economic growth on the fulfilment of 
governing parties’ pledges are strongest for pledges to cut taxes and expand 
programmes. We also found positive effects of favourable economic conditions on the 
likelihood that opposition parties’ pledges are fulfilled. This suggests that some pledges 
made by opposition parties were also supported by governing parties, although not 
explicitly during the election campaign, and are therefore likely to be fulfilled if 
economic conditions permit. Even if parties were able to predict future economic 
conditions accurately, parties may believe that the short-term electoral rewards from 
making attractive but unrealistic pledges outweigh the negative reputation effects of not 
fulfilling them (Callander & Wilkie, 2007). A topic for future research concerns the 
electoral consequences of promise breaking by governing parties. 
With respect to government types, the Irish cases allowed us to compare pledge 
fulfilment in coalitions and single-party governments, both with and without 
parliamentary majorities. We found that the advantage of holding office depends on the 
party’s position in government more than the type of government that forms. We found 
no significant difference between overall rates of pledge fulfilment for governing parties 
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with and without secure parliamentary majorities. The strength of minority governments 
accords with previous research on minority governments in Spain, Sweden and 
elsewhere, which demonstrates that minority governments fulfil their election pledges 
and manage to bring about policy change (Artés & Bustos, 2008; Naurin, 2011; Strøm, 
1990).  
We also found no significant difference in the overall likelihood of pledge 
fulfilment for single-party and coalition governments in Ireland. In this respect, the Irish 
cases differ from cross-national research, which suggests that pledges made by parties 
that govern alone are more likely to be fulfilled (Mansergh & Thomson, 2007). 
Nonetheless, there are differences in fulfilment rates between single-party governments 
and junior coalitions partners. Smaller parties in coalition governments, which usually 
do not receive the chief executive post, are less likely to fulfil their pledges.  
The non-findings with respect to government types (single-party governments 
and coalitions both with and without majorities) suggest that other, arguably deeper 
institutional conditions shape pledge fulfilment, and future cross-national comparative 
research might consider these more extensively. Lijphart’s (1999) famous consensus 
model has been associated with effective performance in several respects. Ireland has an 
intermediate position on the executive-parties’ dimension of consensus democracy 
reflecting its combination of consensual and majoritarian characteristics (ibid.: 248). 
Our evidence shows that when Irish governments are consensual, in the sense that they 
are coalitions of parties that agree with each other, they perform at least as well as 
single-party governments in terms of pledge fulfilment. This finding is also relevant to 
other ways of describing differences among democracies. McGann & Latner (2013) 
argue that policies can be changed more easily in systems of PR-majority rule, of which 
most of the Irish coalitions are examples, than by single-party governments. Parties’ 
abilities to fulfil their election pledges are constrained by these institutions, as well as 
by the prevailing economic conditions when they formulate their pledges and participate 
in government. 
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